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Disclaimer
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Process safety is
associated with the higher severity hazards (threats to human life) that must be
identified and mitigated at any oil & gas production facility. These hazards
often are "high consequence, low frequency". On the other hand, occupational health and safety
(OH&S) is often related to lower severity hazards that occur more
frequently. Process safety is associated with the inherent hazards of the facilities (fire and explosion) as opposed to normal occupational workplace hazards which can result in lost time injuries
(LTI’s).
Example
assignment 
Picture:
Outback SE Queensland, Santos Roma JV
In February 1999 Santos (EQ Field Operations) issued an enquiry to G A
McKee
& Associates Pty Ltd for a proposal to
-
review all existing
piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID’s) for a large gas gathering
system in SE Queensland
-
prepare P&ID’s for the gathering system including 17 compressor stations
-
photograph
and electronically catalogue all the equipment
-
review the general standard of existing facilities (over-pressure hazards and the like)
-
review the requirement for a detailed Hazard and Operability Study
(HazOp)
-
scope any remedial work that may be recommended
Our proposal was approved in March 1999. The site survey for both preparation of P&ID field sketches and safety inspection took place
over a 15 day period.
Our report summarised safety observations made during the field survey, and to present these in a form that takes into account the level of risk.
This enabled the ranking of priorities for consideration of risk treatment options.
The hazard identification work arises from a cursory inspection of over 100 locations. It is no substitute for the more structured form of hazard identification that can be carried out through a team effort in a HAZOP study.
Notes
on process safety
Excellent occupational health and safety statistics tell us nothing about process
safety. A very long safety record free of any fire or explosion incident does not mean that such an occurrence will not happen tomorrow.
Since there is normally little incident or accident data with which to assess current process safety performance, specific knowledge is required on ways and means to reduce risk.
A process safety review is based on a site inspection.
Duration depends on plant size and complexity. 1 - 3 days is the norm. An analysis of the inherent hazards is undertaken and the adequacy of the safety systems in place (protection, protective response, and damage limitation) is
assessed with the help some standard checklists. The focus is on safety “hardware” considerations, although what information that can acquired on “software” in the time available will be utilised.
All safety observations and concerns arising from the site visit
are tabulated in the final report under the headings
-
Description of observation
-
Risk Identification (risk exposure scenario)
-
Risk assessment (semi-quantitative risk priority)
-
Risk treatment (comments/recommendations)
For each risk exposure scenario, a level of risk is allocated based on a method adapted from Australian Standard 4360-1995 Risk Management.
The recommended management approach for each
computed semi-quantitative risk category associated with a site observation is
as follows.
Level of risk
and Recommended management approach
-
H (high):-
senior management
review and responsibility needed.
-
S (significant):-
operations manager attention needed. Remedial action to reduce exposure is recommended, at a
high priority.
-
M (moderate):-
operations manager attention needed. Remedial action to reduce exposure is recommended, at a lower priority.
-
L (low):-
manage
this imperfect state by routine operating procedures and/or operator training and awareness. Local field supervision responsibility
is to be specified. Risks are probably acceptable, and may be accepted by management, or reduced by low cost means.
This hazard identification work arises from site observations by one experienced 3rd party assessor only. It may result in recommendations for further
work. It may result in a recommendation for a more structured (and costly) form of hazard identification that can be carried out through a multi-disciplined team effort in a Hazard & Operability Study
(HAZOP).
We are able to review and update Piping & Instrument Diagrams, plan and chair HAZOP meetings, and assist the client with any action items that may arise from the process safety review.
Risk
Analysis Procedure (Adapted
from AS4369
(1995) - Risk Management
Severity
Categories
|
Category
|
Degree
|
Description
|
|
V
|
Catastrophic
|
Death,
production plant extensively damaged, financial loss > $5m.
|
|
IV
|
Major
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Extensive
injuries, loss of production, financial loss between $1m and $5m.
|
|
III
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Severe
|
Medical
treatment required, on site release contained with outside assistance,
financial loss between $50,000 and $1m.
|
|
II
|
Minor
|
First
aid treatment, on site release immediately controlled, financial loss
between $2,500 and $50,000
|
|
I
|
Insignificant
|
No
injuries, financial loss < $2,500
|
Probability
Levels
|
Level
|
Description
|
Individual
Failure Mode
|
|
A
|
Frequent
|
Likely
to occur on any day
|
|
B
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Probable
|
May
occur several times per year.
|
|
C
|
Occasional
|
May
occur once per year.
|
|
D
|
Remote
|
May
occur once in several years.
|
|
E
|
Improbable
|
May
occur once in hundreds of years.
|
Risk
analysis table -
level of risk
|
Likelihood
|
Consequences
|
|
I
(insignificant)
|
II
(minor)
|
III
(severe)
|
IV
(major)
|
V
(catastrophic)
|
|
A
(frequent)
|
S
(significant)
|
S
(significant)
|
H
(high)
|
H
(high)
|
H
(high)
|
|
B
(probable)
|
M (moderate)
|
S
(significant)
|
S
(significant)
|
H
(high)
|
H
(high)
|
|
C
(occasional)
|
L (low)
|
M (moderate)
|
S
(significant)
|
H
(high)
|
H
(high)
|
|
D
(remote)
|
L (low)
|
L (low)
|
M (moderate)
|
S
(significant)
|
H
(high)
|
|
E
(improbable)
|
L (low)
|
L (low)
|
M (moderate)
|
S
(significant)
|
S
(significant)
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Safety Management Systems Assessment
We have been involved in this
type of work in the past as a team member. For reasons of risk &
liability, and due to organisational sensitivities involved, we do
NOT now take on such work as a small independent consultant. The
greater 'clout' that comes from a multi-disciplined and larger consulting organization
is called for. We can however provide assistance and advice as a part of an
audit team.
- Phase 1: information gathering and review of documentation
- Phase 2: site investigations
- Phase 3: analysis of findings and report generation
The scope of work for a safety
management systems assessment may comprise a detailed review of the following elements, generally in accordance with the requirements of API Recommended Practice 750. In addition “good oilfield practice” is taken into account. This denotes benchmarking the client’s system with some other known leading and reputable
organizations.
|
Safety
Management Systems Assessment
Typical Scope
|
|
A review of the
organization's safety management system
-
roles,
responsibilities and accountabilities
-
communication
-
the
functioning of safety committees
-
level
of commitment
-
methods
in place for identifying hazards
-
the
management of work performed by contractors
This
step would comprise a review of documentation, and interviews with
management and field staff.
|
A review of the
organization's engineering design procedures
-
Conformity
with design codes and standards
-
level
of attention to safety in process design
-
documentation
and drawings
-
plant
modification procedures
-
project management of pipe fabrication and installation phase, from
a safety perspective
-
safety aspects of
commissioning hand-over to Operations
|
|
A
review of operating and maintenance procedures for
gas production and processing operations, in terms of:
-
documentation
-
understanding
and adherence
-
adequacy
-
the
functioning of the “Permit to Work” system
-
the
testing & inspection of critical equipment (e.g., pressure vessels and
safety relief valves) and maintenance planning effectiveness for that
equipment
This
step would involve a review of documentation, interviews with field staff
and site inspections.
|
A
review of personnel and training in terms of:
-
understanding
of the process and process safety
-
understanding
of operating and emergency response procedures
-
amount,
type and effectiveness of training for field staff
|
|
A
review of emergency response preparedness in
terms of:
-
documentation
-
roles
and responsibilities
-
awareness
and training levels
-
interaction
with outside organisations
|
A
review of incident and accident reporting, analysis and follow-up
in terms of:
This
step would comprise a study of the system in place using recent incident
experiences and interviews with management and field staff. |
Some
standards
and guidelines used in safety review
Process
Plant
-
AS
1210 - 1989
SAA Unfired Pressure Vessels Code
-
AS
1271 - 1990
Pressure
Safety Valves
-
AS
1596 - 1989
LP Gas - Storage and Handling
-
AS
1692 - 1989
Tanks for Flammable and Combustible
Liquids
-
AS
1940 - 1993
Storage and Handling of Flammable
and Combustible Liquids
-
AS
2381 - 1991
Electrical Equipment for Explosive
Atmospheres
-
AS
2430 - 1991
Classification
of Hazardous Areas
Field
Compressors
Piping
-
AS
4041 -1992
Pressure Piping
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ASME
B31.3 1990
Chapter VI - Inspection,
Examination , and Testing
Instrumentation
-
API
- RP 14C
Analysis,
Design etc of Basic Surface Safety Systems
-
ISA
- S5.1 1973
Instrumentation Symbols and
Identification
Metering
Pipelines
-
AS
2885 - 1987
Pipelines - Gas and Liquid
Petroleum
-
AS
1978 - 1987
Field Pressure Testing of
Pipelines
-
API-5L 1990
Specification
for Line Pipe
Safety
-
AS
4360 - 1995
Risk
Management
-
AS
4343 - 1999
Pressure equipment – Hazard
levels
-
AIChE
(1985)
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation
Procedures
-
API
RP750
Management of Process Hazards
-
AS/ISO
9001/2 - 1994 Quality
Assurance in Design Development ,
Production, etc
Statutory
Regulations (for Queensland projects
with which we are most familiar)
-
Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004
Chapter 2 (Petroleum tenures and related matters)
-
Workplace
Health & Safety Act 1989, No. 63
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